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Game theory studies situations characterized by strategic interaction of several
individuals, arising when the well-being of at least one individual depends on what
other individuals may do. The analysis of such situations takes two steps. First, they
are formally described by a game, which when represented in normal form is a list
of players (the individuals), strategies (what these individuals can choose) and pay-
offs (representing the well-being of individuals associated with different strategies).
Second, to the game describing the situation being analyzed, a solution concept is
applied to identify strategies with special properties. The interpretation of the result-
ing equilibrium strategies is that they form reasonable predictions for the problem
being studied. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium means that there is at least one
reasonable prediction for the problem in hand, and this justifies the importance that
the question of existence of equilibrium has historically received.
Nash equilibrium is, perhaps, the most widely used solution concept for normal-
form games. It was originally defined in Nash (1950), where its existence was estab-
lished under general conditions. These conditions include, in particular, the continuity
of players’ payoff functions and Nash’s by now classical proof was based on a fixed
point theorem (namely, that of Kakutani (1941)).
Motivated by some economic problems that are naturally modeled by games with
discontinuous payoff functions, Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon (1987), Simon
and Zame (1990), Lebrun (1996), Reny (1999), Carmona (2009), Barelli and Soza
(2009), among others, have considerably extended Nash’s result and technique. This
symposium presents several advances to the literature on existence of Nash equilib-
rium for games with discontinuous payoff functions that emerged from these papers.
The new results presented in this symposium can be understood in light of the
following simple observation: A Nash equilibrium for a game with compact strategy
sets exists if (1) the game can be suitable approximated by a sequence of games, (2)
each game in this sequence of games has an approximate equilibrium with a vanishing
level of approximation and (3) all limit points of every sequence of approximate
equilibria, with a level of approximation converging to zero, of these approximating
games is a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
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In particular, de Castro (2010) introduces a weak form of reciprocal upper semi-
continuity, regularity, and two notions of approximation of games, function approx-
imation and space approximation.1 He then shows that if a regular game can be
approximated in any those senses and if all approximating games have a Nash equilib-
rium, then the original game has a Nash equilibrium (under function approximation,
the original game needs to be weakly payoff secure as defined in Carmona (2009) and,
under space approximation, players’ payoff functions need to be lower semicontinu-
ous). In other words, these results provide a sense for condition (1) in such a way
that if conditions (1) and (2) hold together with regularity, then condition (3) also
holds.
Prokopovych (2010), assuming payoff security (as defined in Reny (1999)) and
a weak form of reciprocally upper semicontinuity, shows that the above three-step
method can be simplified.2 In fact, condition (1) is not needed provided that in
condition (2) one uses a suitable notion of approximate equilibrium in the original
game. Such notion is obtained by suitably approximating players’ value functions
from below. This gives us a 2-step method for establishing the existence of Nash
equilibria consisting of the following conditions: (2’) the game has a sequence of
approximate equilibria with a vanishing level of approximation and (3’) all limit points
of every sequence of approximate equilibria, with a vanishing level of approximation,
of the games is a Nash equilibrium. Particularly interesting is the fact that the
existence of approximate equilibria (i.e., condition (2’)) is established by applying a
fixed-point argument in a way similar to that used originally by Nash.
The above two-step method of establishing the existence of Nash equilibria is
explicitly presented in Carmona (2010). In particular, the notions of approximate
equilibria and of a vanishing level of approximation of such approximate equilibria
1See Reny (1999) for the definition of reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
2It is interesting to note that the weak form of reciprocal upper semicontinuity in Prokopovych
(2010), transfer reciprocal upper semicontinuity, is equivalent to regularity. These two notions are
also equivalent to the notion of better-reply closeness introduced in Carmona (2010). Furthermore,
these notions are equivalent to weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity (as defined in Bagh and Jofre
(2006)) at all strategies that are not a Nash equilibrium.
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are given a precise meaning and a condition on the game, weak better-reply security,
is introduced that allows for an existence result along that two-step method. An im-
portant improvement is that these two steps are applied not the the original game but
rather to a game obtained by replacing players’ payoff functions with better-behaved
functions.3 In particular, in condition (2’) above, it is the better-behaved game (i.e.,
that with the better-behaved functions) that is required to have approximate equi-
libria, and in (3’), one has to consider sequences of approximate equilibria of the
better-behaved game (but the conclusion is unchanged, i.e., the limit points of such
sequences are required to be Nash equilibria of the original game). The importance of
this extension of the two-step method consisting of conditions (2’) and (3’) is that it
allows for the existence result of Barelli and Soza (2009) for generalized better-reply
secure games, which, in particular extends those of Reny (1999) and Carmona (2009).
Reny (2010) presents a limit result in line of condition (3) above. In his result,
the approximation of games is obtained by approximating players’ action spaces with
finite action spaces. In this way, the result in Reny (2010) is related to the limit result
of de Castro (2010) under space approximation. Unlike in de Castro (2010), where
the restriction of each player’s payoff function to the finite action spaces is related to
that player’s original payoff function through the assumption of lower semicontinuous
payoff functions, no such relationship is assumed in the limit result of Reny (2010).
Despite this level of generality, Reny (2010) shows that under general conditions there
exists a countable set of pure strategies such that the limit result (i.e., condition (3))
holds provided that the approximating sets of pure strategies eventually include each
member of the countable set.4
Balder (2010) also establishes a limit result related to condition (3) above. In this
limit result, there is a sequence of games and a convergent sequence of Nash equilibria
3These better-behaved functions are a particular form of an envelope of the original payoff func-
tions: for each players, it is the function that belongs to the class of functions that are both gener-
alized payoff secure (as in Barelli and Soza (2009)) and below the original one and that yields the
highest value function within this class.
4As requested by Philip Reny, footnote 3 in Reny (2010) should be replaced with the following:
“For fixed B, the real-valued function of m defined by m(B) can be shown to be measurable.”
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of those games. However, unlike condition (3), it is not assumed that players’ payoff
functions are approximating a given profile of payoff functions. Nevertheless, the main
result of Balder (2010) shows that a conclusion akin to that in condition (3) holds
for some “limit” game. More precisely, it shows that there exist payoff functions, a
resolvent payoff profile in the terminology of Balder (2010), that are related to those
in the sequence of games and are such that the limit strategy is a Nash equilibria of
the game with the resolvent payoff profile.
One of the important consequences of the main theorem in Balder (2010) is that
it gives us a limit result for games with an endogenous sharing rule. Games with
an endogenous sharing rule, as introduced by Simon and Zame (1990), extend the
notion of a normal-form game by describing players’ payoffs with a correspondence
rather than with a function. In this context, the equilibrium concept (i.e., a solution
in the terminology of Simon and Zame (1990)) is a measurable selection of the payoff
correspondence and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the normal-form game
defined using this selection. The limit result of Balder (2010) provides a limit result
for games with an endogenous sharing result. In fact, it shows that if a sequence of
solutions is such that each selection in the sequence is continuous and the sequence
of strategies is convergent, then there exists a solution such that the strategy is the
limit of the sequence of strategies and the selection is closely related to the sequence
of selections. As shown in Balder (2010), this limit result can be used to compute
and to establish the existence of equilibrium in games with an endogenous sharing
rule.
The question of existence of a solution for games with an endogenous sharing rule
is also considered in de Castro (2010), more specifically, the relationship between the
approaches used in the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and of Simon and Zame
(1990). Viewing a normal-form game as a special case of a game with an endogenous
sharing rule (namely, one with a singleton-valued payoff correspondence), we can
describe the result in de Castro (2010) as showing that for every game that satisfies
the conditions in the existence theorem of either Simon and Zame (1990) or Reny
(1999), there exists a selection of the payoff correspondence satisfying regularity, i.e.,
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his weak notion of reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
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